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I offer one-liners about some others. Three discuss equality either in 
general (Rachels and Miller) or regarding provision of health care (Norman 
Daniels). Both depart from Nielsen's ultraegalitarian pronouncements, but all 
seem to accept a general principle of equality in the provision of "opportuni- 
ties" or at least of "basic" health care-but do no better than Nielsen in 
offering any actual support for any such principle. Richard Miller ("Justice as 
Social Freedom") explores the "supposed" opposition of freedom and equality 
by accepting a "minimal specification centering on a demand for equality of 
opportunity, which every partisan of social freedom would accept on adequate 
reflection" (p. 38). Not surprisingly, he "finds" that freedom, far from conflict- 
ing with equality, presupposes a large measure of it-it is easy to overcome 
oppositions if you redefine one of the opposed members in terms of the other! 
Robert Ware ("Marx on Some Phases of Communism") does some really useful 
service in analyzing Marx's actual pronouncements about the way things are 
supposed to go after capitalism-making it clear to this reader why nobody 
should want to "advance" to any of those phases in the first place. Braybrooke 
finds that Marx has both of his concepts of needs, and says some useful things 
about both. 
Terence Penelhum discusses the Euthyphro result on religion and ethics 
an area where Nielsen seems to me entirely in the right. Penelhum tries to 
show that nevertheless acceptance of Christianity would or should make some 
difference to the content of morality. I am not convinced, but a sentence is 
not enough to say why. And C. B. Martin does a beautiful job dissecting some 
of the currently fashionable trends in metaphysics and epistemology with 
which Nielsen has lately come to sympathize, notably some sort of conceptual 
relativism and antirealism. And I found Marsha Hanen's quasi-feminist meta- 
philosophical essay impenetrable. 
There is food for thought in these papers, even if the volume is not quite 
in the class of things you've just got to rush out and buy. 
JAN NARVESON 
University of Waterloo 
Mele, Alfred R. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. ix+ 272. $39.95 (cloth). 
Mele's main project is to give a causal account of human action that is sensitive 
to the variety of ways in which such action may come about. Chapter 2 argues 
that his sort of "causalist" account (according to which all action has an inten- 
tional component that reflects the reasons for which the action is performed 
and by which the action is caused) is compatible with "physicalism" (the view 
that every substance, event, or state of affairs is, or supervenes on, a physical 
substance, event, or state of affairs). Chapter 3 discusses the principle (held 
by Donald Davidson to be self-evident) that, if an agent wants to do x more 
than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then 
he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally. Mele criticizes 
this principle but then proposes a complicated modification of it. This modified 
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principle may suggest that preponderant motivation to do x is irresistible, but 
Mele denies this, noting that such motivation would be irresistible only if we 
lacked control over the strengths of our desires and claiming that we frequently 
have such control. Chapter 4 discusses this point, and chapter 5 provides an 
analysis of what it is for a desire to be irresistible. Chapter 6 discusses David- 
son's claim that an action is intentional only if it is done for a reason consisting 
of a want/belief pair such that the belief identifies the action as conducive to 
the achievement of the wanted item. Mele criticizes this claim, on the grounds 
that it fails to accommodate actions that are done entirely for their own sake, 
and then proposes a modification of it. 
The foregoing constitutes part 1 of the book. Part 2 focuses on the role 
of intention in particular in the etiology of action. Mele contends that proximal 
intentions (intentions to act here and now) play a crucial role in the causation 
of action by mediating between reasons and actions. Chapter 7 notes that 
intending to act in a certain way does not require being preponderantly moti- 
vated to act in that way. (One's evaluative judgments may be at odds with 
one's desires-a theme central to Mele's earlier book, Irrationality [New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987], which focuses on akrasia-and one's inten- 
tions may reflect the former rather than the latter.) Chapter 8 addresses the 
following argument: one intends to do x only if one believes that one will 
(probably) do x; one does x intentionally only if one intended to do x; hence, 
one does x intentionally only if one believed that one would (probably) do x. 
Mele rejects the conclusion; he favors retaining a variant of the first premise 
while rejecting the second. Chapter 9 attacks the view that intentions are 
reducible to belief/desire complexes. In particular, it is noted that intentions 
have an executive dimension that involves settling (not necessarily irrevocably) 
on a certain course of action aimed at bringing the world into conformity 
with one's plans. Chapter 10 discusses and endorses a principle (very roughly, 
the converse of that endorsed in chap. 3) to the effect that, if one does x 
intentionally, then one is more motivated to do x than to do any competing 
action. (Mele appears to regard this principle and its converse-both suitably 
qualified-to be conceptual truths.) This chapter also argues against John 
Searle's claim that intentional action essentially involves "intention in action" 
rather than "prior intention." Chapter 11 attacks the thesis, endorsed by Searle, 
Gilbert Harman, and others, that the content of an intention must make 
reference to itself. Chapter 12 discusses the variety of ways in which intentions 
may be acquired. And chapter 13 criticizes two recent arguments against a 
causalist approach to the explanation of action. 
Throughout this book Mele is flexible and undogmatic, giving a full and 
sensitive hearing to rival views. The discussion is extremely detailed. He uses 
the work of several prominent philosophers as foils, and the frequent refer- 
ences to the work of others are both apt and helpful. In addition, he shows 
himself to be at home with the pertinent psychological literature. 
There is space for only three brief and highly selective observations. 
First, it seems clear that Mele implicitly favors compatibilism. He does 
not shrink from talk of the causation (by events or states) of action coupled 
with talk of the agent's control over his actions. Nonetheless, an incompatibilist 
could accept a great deal of what Mele says. There is in general no need for 
an incompatibilist o deny that action can be caused, even when causation is 
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understood to be deterministic (involving sufficient causal conditions) rather 
than merely probabilistic. It is only free action-action over which the agent 
exercises control-that the incompatibilist akes to be inconsistent with unin- 
terrupted causation, and even here there is plenty of room for causation to 
operate, both prior to action (e.g., with respect to the acquisition of beliefs, 
desires, and intentions) and subsequent to action (e.g., with respect to the 
consequences of the action or with respect to that which is level-generated by 
the action). Somewhere, of course, there must be a break in the causal chain, 
a break which would seem not to allow for the sort of unqualifiedly causal 
explanation of action that Mele favors. Still, depending on the exact nature 
of the incompatibilist account, much of Mele's account might be retained. 
Second, Mele's adherence to the principle (only roughly stated here) that 
one does x intentionally only if one is preponderantly motivated to do x seems 
to be what commits him to saying that the only way to exercise control over 
whether one does x is by exercising control over the strength of one's motiva- 
tion to do x. But while this is surely one way in which to exercise control, 
another and perhaps more common way would appear to be this: one doesn't 
control the strength of one's motivation, but one controls one's susceptibility 
to it. Consider an analogy. Sam can control whether or not he is swept away 
by a flood of water either by controlling the (source of the) flood or by swim- 
ming so as to counteract its force. Only in the former case does Sam affect 
the strength of the force that moves, or may move, him. 
Finally, while Mele holds that all intentional action involves the intention 
to act, he denies, as noted above, the view that one does x intentionally only 
if one intended to do x. He prefers to retain a variant of the view that one 
intends to do x only if one believes that one will (probably) do x. But there is 
reason to take the opposite tack. The difference between merely hoping to 
do x and intending to do x would seem to rest not in the degree to which one 
takes it to be probable that one will do x but in whether or not one has a plan 
to see one's project through. One cannot (normally) intentionally roll a six 
with a die in part because one cannot (normally) intend to do this, and one 
cannot (normally) intend to do it because one can (normally) have no plan as 
to how, beyond the initial throw, to see one's project of doing so through. 
One can, however, intentionally shoot a target, even if one believes one's 
chance of success is one in six (or less) because one can intend to do so, and 
one can intend to do so because one can have a plan that involves seeing one's 
project through (adjusting one's aim, etc.) in order to maximize one's chance 
of success. 
The foregoing barely scratches the surface of this rich and subtle book. 
It is a very impressive and provocative piece of work. It is difficult, but im- 
portant, and deserves widespread attention. 
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
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